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Heidegger (Being With)
(couldn't resist adding my 2 cents. Excerpt from The Philosophy of Sartre-Mary Warnock)
BEING-FOR-OTHERS
Heidegger
Sartre considers Heidegger's account of human relations. Here there is a powerful move away from considering mere awareness, or perception, of others; for the basic notion which is used to explain human relations is not Being-for-others, but Being-with-others. I confess to finding Heidegger both unintelligible and unattractive, and Sartre's exposition of his theory is far from being, or even trying to be, clear. But, roughly speaking, the relation Being with is held to be not at all a matter of recognition of the existence of someone other than myself in the world, but entirely a matter of the manifest solidarity of the human contents of the world against the rest, 'It expresses... a sort of ontological solidarity for the exploitation of this world.' I am not to be thought of as face to face with another person whom I recognize as like myself. It is rather that I find myself dependent on other people in whatever I do. In this condition of
mutual interdependence, one does not necessarily realize the uniqueness of each individual person. Not to recognize uniqueness is to be, in Heidegger's terminology in the 'unauthentic state'. In this state each is interchangeable with any other' and such a a state is symbolized, or perhaps expressed, in my willingness for instance, to wear ready-made clothes (which would do for anybody), to use public transport (designed for the convenience of anybody who wants it), to sit in public gardens, and so on. Each one comes to realize his own uniqueness when he contemplates his own death, which is the one thing necessarily unique for each of us. 'Authenticity and individuality have to be earned. I shall be my own authenticity only if, under the call of conscience, I launch out towards death... as towards my own most particular possibility. At this moment reveal myself to myself in authenticity, and I raise others along with myself to the
authentic.'
Luckily Sartre rejects this theory too, on the ground, mainly, that it is too abstract and general, to a priori, to help at all towards accounting for the precise, concrete relation between me and another concrete individual; and on the ground also, that if I pretend that the concept of Being-with depends determines my relations with people in general this is an act of Bad Faith. Moreover, Heidegger's theory offers no kind of proof of the existence of others; and this is what Sartre is seeking to provide. From his consideration and rejection of all these theories,(Husserl,Hegel,Heidegger) Sartre derives the conviction that whatever our relation with other people is we cannot lump people all together and try to define our consciousness of persons as a whole. This insistence on the particularity and concreteness of descriptions, from which ontological and metaphysical and general statements may be drawn, is what most clearly characterizes
existentialist writing-and what, incidentally, makes it perfectly plausible for Sartre to use novel es and plays as well as straight philosophical expositions to convey philosophical doctrines. We have here come, that is to say, upon the most important and characteristic demand which Sartre makes of philosophy, that is should be concrete, particular, and true to life.
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BEING-FOR-OTHERS
Heidegger
Sartre considers Heidegger's account of human relations. Here there is a powerful move away from considering mere awareness, or perception, of others; for the basic notion which is used to explain human relations is not Being-for-others, but Being-with-others. I confess to finding Heidegger both unintelligible and unattractive, and Sartre's exposition of his theory is far from being, or even trying to be, clear. But, roughly speaking, the relation Being with is held to be not at all a matter of recognition of the existence of someone other than myself in the world, but entirely a matter of the manifest solidarity of the human contents of the world against the rest, 'It expresses... a sort of ontological solidarity for the exploitation of this world.' I am not to be thought of as face to face with another person whom I recognize as like myself. It is rather that I find myself dependent on other people in whatever I do. In this condition of
mutual interdependence, one does not necessarily realize the uniqueness of each individual person. Not to recognize uniqueness is to be, in Heidegger's terminology in the 'unauthentic state'. In this state each is interchangeable with any other' and such a a state is symbolized, or perhaps expressed, in my willingness for instance, to wear ready-made clothes (which would do for anybody), to use public transport (designed for the convenience of anybody who wants it), to sit in public gardens, and so on. Each one comes to realize his own uniqueness when he contemplates his own death, which is the one thing necessarily unique for each of us. 'Authenticity and individuality have to be earned. I shall be my own authenticity only if, under the call of conscience, I launch out towards death... as towards my own most particular possibility. At this moment reveal myself to myself in authenticity, and I raise others along with myself to the
authentic.'
Luckily Sartre rejects this theory too, on the ground, mainly, that it is too abstract and general, to a priori, to help at all towards accounting for the precise, concrete relation between me and another concrete individual; and on the ground also, that if I pretend that the concept of Being-with depends determines my relations with people in general this is an act of Bad Faith. Moreover, Heidegger's theory offers no kind of proof of the existence of others; and this is what Sartre is seeking to provide. From his consideration and rejection of all these theories,(Husserl,Hegel,Heidegger) Sartre derives the conviction that whatever our relation with other people is we cannot lump people all together and try to define our consciousness of persons as a whole. This insistence on the particularity and concreteness of descriptions, from which ontological and metaphysical and general statements may be drawn, is what most clearly characterizes
existentialist writing-and what, incidentally, makes it perfectly plausible for Sartre to use novel es and plays as well as straight philosophical expositions to convey philosophical doctrines. We have here come, that is to say, upon the most important and characteristic demand which Sartre makes of philosophy, that is should be concrete, particular, and true to life.
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Re: Heidegger (Being With) / richard haden <richard_haden-AT-yahoo.com> / 19 Feb 2010
Re: Heidegger (Being With) to Laurie and RH / JEAN PARR <jeanparr-AT-btinternet.com> / 21 Feb 2010
Re: Heidegger (Being With) laurie and RH/JP,dancingrussianbear / Laurie Colson <lauriecolson-AT-yahoo.com> / 25 Feb 2010
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